

October 9, 1974

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prohibited the imposition of an import fee on crude oil when the price of imported oil is higher than the domestic price. We understand that this approach is currently included in the Committee's new tax reform proposals which will be in final form in the near future. If such legislation were to become law, the provision in the Senate version of H.R. 3193 providing for rebate of the fee on oil imports would be meaningless with respect to crude oil imports (assuming that the foreign price continues to be higher than the domestic price).

4. Dedication of import fees for this and numerous other purposes which have currently been suggested tends to lock the government into a particular form of protection and it would remove the flexibility which Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act intended to give the President. For instance, it would be very difficult to shift to a quota system or to adopt a variable fee. It is also worth noting that the misuse of the import program to subsidize all sorts of special interests was responsible for much of the abuse of the former quota system. To now use fees for purposes other than those relating directly to national security, may cause the fee system to fall into the same disrepute.

In light of these considerations, I strongly urge that the Conference Committee not adopt the provision of the Senate bill providing for the rebate of oil import fees.

Sincerely,

JOHN C. SAWHILL,
Administrator.

THE UNSOLVED BREAK-INS, 1970-74

Mr. ABOUREZK, Mr. President, the hydra-headed monster that goes by the name of Watergate is only now beginning to be fully exposed. How far we must go before we understand the depth of the danger in which our Government system was placed is dramatized by Mr. Robert Fink's article, "The Unsolved Break-Ins 1970-74," which appeared in the October 10 issue of Rolling Stone.

Bob Fink was the researcher for Woodward and Bernstein's book, "All the President's Men." His work is meticulous. What he finds is frightening in the extreme. I ask unanimous consent that Bob Fink's article be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. ABOUREZK, Mr. President, the burden of this article is as simple as its detail is impressive. By exhaustively comparing over 100 illegal break-ins during the period 1970-74, Mr. Fink finds obvious patterns which strongly suggest a coordinated Government plan to spy on, harass, and disrupt persons and organizations whose views were considered dangerous by the Government. Targets of the break-ins included scores of persons from the infamous "enemies list," as well as many others whose one distinguishing characteristic was opposition to various Government policies or to the re-election of Richard Nixon.

Mr. President, this article constitutes an overwhelming case for further congressional investigation. It offers a thousand leads that need pursuit by a congressional panel armed with the power to compel testimony.

The case for further investigation is even more compelling in light of informa-

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helped in the activities of the Weathermen and Black Panthers." We also find that a memorandum on "Operation Sandwedge," the proposed Nixon campaign intelligence arm, specifically suggests a "manipulated threat of indictment" by the Justice Department against personnel of a security group the Republicans believed might be used by Democrats.

Bob Fink's article should be the basis for a full-scale investigation. We ought to know who committed these 100 break-ins, who authorized them, to what extent they were part of a coordinated Government policy, and we must take steps to insure this sort of wholly illegal, dangerous activity is eliminated in the future.

Exhibit 1 follows:

EXHIBIT 1

THE UNSOLVED BREAK-INS, 1970-1974

(By Robert Fink)

Aware of its inherent illegality, President Nixon approved the Huston Plan on July 23rd, 1970, creating a secret superintelligence agency under White House auspices; his order amalgamated the FBI, the CIA, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the NSA (National Security Agency) and the counterintelligence agencies of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Laws forbidding some of these organizations' participation in domestic operations were bypassed. The plan's avowed purpose was to remove "operational restraints" on domestic intelligence collection, enabling the government to increase its use of wiretaps, carry out mail searches and put more undercover agents on college campuses.

It also removed restraints on the government's right to make surreptitious entries against "urgent security targets," even though Huston's memorandum acknowledged: "Use of this technique is clearly illegal; it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion."

Under the sword of John Dean's imminent disclosure, the president confirmed the plan's existence on May 22nd, 1973, describing it as "a directive to strengthen our intelligence operations," and insisting it was rescinded on July 28th, 1970, as a result of J. Edgar Hoover's opposition. Hoover was unwilling to increase the role of other agencies to participate in domestic intelligence.

Events indicate that many of Huston's recommendations were carried out: The essence survived without its label.

On June 27th, 1973, John Dean told the Ervin Committee he had never seen any document to indicate the president had disapproved or rescinded the Huston Plan.

On July 9th, 1973, Huston told a closed House Armed Services Intelligence subcommittee hearing, the plan was never formally cancelled.

At least 100 break-ins, apparently political in nature, occurred during the Nixon administration. Clandestine invasions of homes and offices were made against numerous individuals and groups considered "enemies" of the administration. "Enemies," both on and

house's prepared list, included radicals and liberals opposed to policy, political foes, and foreign diplomats hostile to American interests. Victims, not themselves "enemies," were the targets of documents or other material damaging to "enemies" or to the administration itself.

Evidence linking the government break-ins is largely clear in both striking and pervasive. Not only were virtually all the victims objects of administration concern or suspicion, but the attacks against them followed a consistent pattern. The most striking characteristic of this modus operandi is that, aside from taking relatively insignificant trinkets, the intruders did not touch cash or valuables. They appeared to be under orders or to have a code of honor which precluded the stealing of material possessions. Instead, the burglars looked for information: correspondence, financial records, tapes, the contents of files. The break-ins uniformly occurred when the premises were expected to be empty. The targets were carefully studied in advance; the intruders appeared to know their victims' schedules and the general or precise location of their documents. Entry was usually forced; there was little effort to conceal the attempts—at least where a break-in has been identified. When police were called a perfunctory investigation was made; fingerprints were taken; the victim was told little or nothing; the case died.

The break-ins often came in clusters which took place over a period of a few days. It cannot be inferred that this clustering occurred because one central authority directed the break-ins. It does suggest, however, that individual break-in teams may have been operationally active in spasms, either because an "in-the-field" momentum was created, or because each mission required approval which tended to be granted in groups at intermittent intervals.

Since the break-ins continued after the Watergate arrests—indeed, into this summer—it is a reasonable speculation that other teams of burglars were involved; either additional "plumbers" or special FBI or CIA investigative units.

It remains to be seen how many break-ins were directly or indirectly White House sponsored, and if any will be unraveled. It seems unlikely that local police authorities or the FBI or the Justice Department will make any dent in their resolution. Extensive interrogation of many key Nixon operatives seems to have been fruitless in linking their former colleagues to additional break-ins, despite a promise of immunity in exchange for "telling all"—and the threat of punishment for withholding information. Questioning of the Watergate burglars, under similar conditions, is believed to have been equally unproductive. Disclosure of the connections between "other break-ins" and the clandestine operations of the Nixon administration, largely depends on the efforts of the Special Prosecutor and the possible revelations coming out of the Watergate cover-up trial.

The following summary of break-ins is not a comprehensive list, but illustrative of the general pattern.

Many of the earliest victims were radicals and their attorneys. The experience of Gerald Lefcourt, a 32-year-old New York lawyer, is typical of several activists who adamantly challenged the administration on domestic issues and the war in Vietnam. Lefcourt's clients included Mark Rudd, the Black Panthers and SDS; he was part of the defense in the Chicago 7 and Detroit 15 trials. During 1970 and 1971, he sustained three break-ins and a fire at his home. Two of the office break-ins are considered everyday type—writer robberies. The other incidents are not: